Investigating the efficiency of financial stock markets with high frequency data

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Arbitrageurs enforce the law of one price. But how does arbitrage affect liquidity?

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 - then "with arbitrage present, the adverse selection costs of domestic dealers increase, so that ... liquidity falls"
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- But if arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of differences in information
 - then "with arbitrage present, the adverse selection costs of domestic dealers increase, so that ... liquidity falls"
 [Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998)]
- Impact of arbitrage on liquidity depends on reasons why arbitrage opportunities arise

▶ Part 1: How do arbitrage opportunities arise?

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- for example, if arbitrage opportunities arise because of demand pressure arbitrageurs might trade against net market order imbalance:
 - which would improve liquidity contemporaneous [Chordia, Roll, Subrahmanyam (2002)]
 - and improve future liquidity [O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) and Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, Seasholes (2010)]

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 \blacktriangleright here: arbitrage activity decreases \implies liquidity decreases

for example, several frictions affect arbitrage activity

Short sell constrains; Transaction tax (2018, in the EU);
 Margin requirements

Do these frictions only harm the efficiency of the market or also its liquidity?


The setting: Data (American Depositary Receipts)

- American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) which are cross-listed securities, and should trade at the same price as home market stock, because
 - give same cash flow as home market stock and can be converted to each other, which minimizes risk in arbitrage
- this makes ADR especially suitable to study arbitrage [Gagnon and Karolyi (2010)]
- Standard sources to create sample: Datastream, adrbnymellon.com and adr.db.com
- ▶ 5 different home markets, NYSE and Forex (72 stock pairs)

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- Standard sources to create sample: Datastream, adrbnymellon.com and adr.db.com
- 5 different home markets, NYSE and Forex (72 stock pairs)
- Tick-by-tick data from 1996 to 2013 on (almost 9 billion) quotes and (almost 1 billion) trades: TRTH

The setting: The clock (in UTC) 2008-10-15



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The mechanics of arbitrage in the ADR market




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Part 0: How to work with terabytes of financial data?


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Exogenous variation in impediments to arbitrage within the day Exogenous variation in impediments to arbitrage across days Impulse Response Functions

Transaction taxes

US tick-by-tick data (TAQ)



My first attempt: Mysql framework

I started writing my stored procedure:

get_ohlc_for(ticker, between, bucket)

when I coded:

```
SUBSTRING_INDEX(
MAX(CONCAT(time, '_', price)), '_', -1
) AS 'close'
```

I realized MySQL might not be the best DB for financial data.

My second attempt: OneTick framework

	날 원 🖷 🗉									
ndex	Symbol	Time	PRICE	SIZE	TRD_EX	COND	CORR	G127	OMDSEQ	BuySellFlag
Index	Symbol	Time	PRICE	SIZE	TRD_EX	COND	CORR	G127	OMDSEQ	Buy/SellFlag
1	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:00.000	130.4600000	100	Z	F	0	0	0	-1.0000000
2	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:00.000	130.4400000	100	Р	Q	0	0	1	1.0000000
3	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:00.000	130.4400000	100	Р	F	0	0	2	1.0000000
4	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:00.000	130.4400000	100	Р	F	0	0	3	1.0000000
5	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.4700000	(W	ades < TAO::IBN					
6	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.4600000	Sign_tr	ades < TAQ:IBN	1 > - Graph Edi	tor			(
7	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.4700000	Graph E	dit View No	de Help				
8	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.4800000							
9	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.4900000			Query name	sign_trades		Security list	NE MARKET
10	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.4800000				0			
11	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000 2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.5000000 130.5200000		▶8 ▶ ₽					
12	TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.5200000							
13	TAQ::IBM TAO::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:01.000	130.5200000							
14		2010/01/20 09:30:01.000 2010/01/20 09:30:02.000	130.5300000							
	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:02.000	130,4800000							
16	TAQ::IBM									
17	TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:03.000	130.4600000							
17 18	TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000	130.4600000 130.5300000		OTE	•			TRD	•
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Date and time MM/DD//YYYY	TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM TAQ::IBM	2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 2010/01/20 09:30:03.000 <u>End</u>	130.4600000 130.5300000 130.5300000 130.5300000 130.5000000 130.4900000 130.5300000 Timegane zw York							
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
OneTick "code"

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Apps 🖛 HPC-Cloud Sara Web 👛 SARA CI	oud NEW 🕒 HP	C Cloud doc	ument 🧧 OneTick 🛄 Journals 🛄 SUNY 🛄 RSM 🛛 🐘 Other bookman
initial commit	4 years ago	1	[get_exchange_efficiency]
rewrote get_exchange_efficiency to han	3 months ago	3	COMMENT = RUN in New York time zone. Otherwwise cannot join by time,
🔮 adjust for new data till 2013	3 years ago	4	CPU_NUMBER = 1
rewrote get_exchange_efficiency to han	3 months ago (0 5 6 7 8 9	DB_HINT_FOR_PROCESSING_HOST = graph_reuse = 0 NODE_L0 = COMPUTE(COMPUTE="HIGH(INPUT_FIELD_WHE=HIGH.PROFIT_PCT_OUTF AVERAGE(INPUT_FIELD_WHE=HIGH.PROFIT_PCT_OUTPUT_FIELD_WHE=PROFIT_PCT HIGH(INPUT_FIELD_WHE=HIGH.PROFIT_OUTPUT_FIELD_WHE=PROFIT_"), BUCKET_J
🐏 adjust for new data till 2013	3 years ago ा	10 11 12 13 14	NODE_10_SCURCE = NODE_24.IF NODE_10_X = 1336 NODE_10_Y = 476 NODE_11 = NESTED_OTQ add_field.otq::add_days_between_corp_act NODE_11_UTUNTED = 1
🗊 minor changes	2 years ago	15	NODE_11_PARAMETER = MAX_DAYS_BETWEEN_CORPS 21
🔮 adjust for new data till 2013	3 years ago t	 16 17 18 19 20 	NODE_11_SCURCE = NODE_6.NODE_13. NODE_11_SCURCE_DESCRIPTION = NODE_6.NODE_13. IN. NODE_11_X = 1822 NODE_11_Y = 1216 NODE_14 = NERGE
rewrote get_exchange_efficiency to han	3 months ago (21 22 23	<pre>NODE_14_BIND_SECURITY = eval("get_symbols.otq::get_symbols","DB+'TICK NODE_14_BIND_SECURITY = DAILY_AGGREGATED_INPUT_EX::VOD.L 19950101 No NODE 14_SOURCE = NODE 32</pre>
adjust for new data till 2013	3 years ago	24	NODE 14 X = 1856


Step 0: Setting up reference data

- Exchange trading times (e.g., LSE: 08:00-16:30 GMT)
- Price adjustments (e.g., VOD.L in pence)
- Price currency (e.g., VOD.L in GBP)
- Symbology mappings
- Corporate actions


Step 1: Convert prices into common currency



Step 2: Calculate price parity deviations



Market (in)efficiency: deviations from the fair price



Step 3 Run on server (using GNU Parallel)

```
database = ${1}
query = ${2}
for date in dates.txt ; do
    sem -k --id exp -P ot.cpus
        export.pl ${database} ${date} ${query}
done
```

sem --wait --id exp

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
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Example Vodafone on 1999-06-15



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How do price deviations arise? (part of Table 2)

	# [MM]	%price pressure	%Home	%Host	%Both	%Forex
Home	3.3					
Host	4.2					
Both	2.1					
Forex	1.8					

Following Schultz and Shive (2010)

How do price deviations arise? (part of Table 2)

	# [MM]	%price pressure	%Home	%Host	%Both	%Forex
Home	3.74	0.70***	0.45	0.27	0.17	0.11
Host	4.64	0.78***	0.19	0.52	0.17	0.11
Both	2.29		0.24	0.32	0.36	0.09
Forex	1.95		0.20	0.26	0.12	0.43

Following Schultz and Shive (2010)

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Two main challenges:

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 - Limits-of-arbitrage tells us what these costs are: e.g. risk, illiquidity, and capital constrains

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 - e.g., price deviations are "a symptom of a market in severe shortage of arbitrage capital" (Hu, Pan, Wang 2013)

Two main challenges:

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 - Limits-of-arbitrage tells us what these costs are: e.g. risk, illiquidity, and capital constrains
 - e.g., price deviations are "a symptom of a market in severe shortage of arbitrage capital" (Hu, Pan, Wang 2013)
 - thus price deviations are a proxy for the impediments to arbitrage

The setting: Daily proxies

For impediments to arbitrage:

- ► *INARB_d*: seconds it takes for a price deviation to vanish
- ► Δ*QTE_d*: difference in best bid and best ask price across the ADR and home market share
- ΔTRD_d : difference in prices of simultaneous trades

The setting: Daily proxies

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For market quality:

quoted spreads

The setting: Daily proxies

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For market quality:

- quoted spreads
- effective spreads (in paper)

Two main challenges:

2) How to address reverse causality between illiquidity and impediments to arbitrage?

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
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 Control directly for other important variables that explain illiquidity, e.g. volatility (in paper)

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- Use a panel regression to control for time- and stock-invariant heterogeneity (in paper)

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- Use a panel regression to control for time- and stock-invariant heterogeneity (in paper)
- Use a difference approach...

Difference in illiquidity during and outside overlapping trading times



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
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The mechanics of arbitrage in the ADR market



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Summary statistics (part of Table 1)

	avg	stddev	min	median	max
$avg(\Delta TRD)$	0.45	0.33	0.06	0.40	2.41
$avg(\Delta QTE)$	0.25	0.20	0.00	0.23	0.88
$max(\Delta QTE)$	0.73	0.46	0.14	0.66	3.07
duration [sec]	414	429	4	315	2,479


Summary statistics (part of Table 1)

	avg	stddev	min	median	max		
<u> </u>							
Panel A: Price deviations outside days between corporate actions:							
$avg(\Delta TRD)$	0.45	0.33	0.06	0.40	2.41		
$avg(\Delta QTE)$	0.25	0.20	0.00	0.23	0.88		
$max(\Delta QTE)$	0.73	0.46	0.14	0.66	3.07		
duration [sec]	414	429	4	315	2,479		
Panel B: Price deviations during days between corporate actions:							
# days	18	21	0	12	102		
$avg(\Delta QTE)$	1.46	2.57	0.07	0.85	13.10		
$avg(\Delta AQTE)$	0.62	0.84	0.00	0.30	4.82		
$max(\Delta QTE)$	2.48	2.55	0.25	2.00	13.80		
$max(\Delta AQTE)$	1.27	0.98	0.14	0.89	5.17		

How does arbitrage affect liquidity: Panel instrumental variable regression. (part of Table 6)

$$PQSPR_{i,d} = \alpha + \beta \times \Delta \widehat{Price_{i,d}} + \beta \times Controls_{i,d} + \epsilon_{i,d}$$

Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Home_i, Home_i



How does arbitrage affect liquidity: Panel instrumental variable regression. (part of Table 6)

$$\delta PQSPR_{i,d} = \alpha + \beta \times \Delta \widehat{Price_{i,d}} + \beta \times Controls_{i,d} + \epsilon_{i,d}$$

Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Host_{i,d} Home_i, Home_i

INARBQ_008***		0.010*		
(0.00)		(0.07)		
$avg(\Delta QTE_{i,d})$ 0.018***		0.02	3*	
(0.00))	(0.0	9)	
$max(\Delta QTE_{i,d})$	0.013***		0.017*	
	(0.00)		(0.07)	
$max(\Delta AQTE_{i,d})$	0.060***		(0.075*
	(0.00)			(0.07)
$avg(\Delta TRD_{i,d})$	0.0)17***		0.022*
	(0.	.00)		(0.09)
Controls		Yes		
StockFE		Yes		
DayFE		Yes		
StockDays	1	36,363		32 / 38

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
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
Impulse Response Functions

Transaction taxes

How does arbitrage affect liquidity: Impulse response functions (Figure 1)



How does arbitrage affect liquidity: Impulse response functions (Figure 3)



The impact of transaction taxes on impediments to arbitrage. (Table 8)

 $LHS_{i,d} = FE + \beta_0 \times FFTT_{i,d} + \beta_1 \times AfterFFTT_{home,i,d} + \beta_2 \times AfterFFTT_{host,i}$

	INARB _{i,d}	$a(\Delta Q_{i,d})$	$m(\Delta Q_{i,d})$	$m(\Delta AQ_{i,d})$) a($\Delta T_{i,d}$)
FFTT _{i,d}	-0.726	-0.069	0.274	-0.061	0.083
	(0.48)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.53)
AfterFFTT _{Home,i,d}	1.299***	0.089***	0.128***	0.091***	0.125***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
AfterFFTT _{Host,i,d}	0.415	0.054	0.031	0.007	0.049
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.74)	(0.90)	(0.55)
StockFE			Yes		
DayFE			Yes		
StockDays			17,358		

The impact of transaction taxes on illiquidity. (Table 8)

 $LHS_{i,d} = FE + \beta_0 \times FFTT_{i,d} + \beta_1 \times AfterFFTT_{home,i,d} + \beta_2 \times AfterFFTT_{host,i}$

	Panel B: PQSPR		Panel C: PESPR		Panel D: $\delta PQSPR$	
	$Host_{i,d}$	Home _{i,d}	$Host_{i,d}$	Home _{i,d}	$Host_{i,d}$	Home _{i,d}
$FFTT_{i,d}$	0.066	0.012	0.023	0.011	0.044**	0.001
	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.04)	(0.84)
AfterFFTT _{Ho}	_{me} 0,046***	0.005**	0.037*	0.005*	-0.011	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.39)	(0.87)
AfterFFTT _{Ho}	st,†,0.013	0.001	-0.021	-0.001	-0.007	0.002
	(0.18)	(0.62)	(0.27)	(0.63)	(0.16)	(0.11)
StockFE		Yes				
DayFE		Yes				
StockDays		136,363				

Summary

- Arbitrage opportunities mainly arise due to demand pressure
- An increase in the impediments to arbitrage deteriorates liquidity
 - contemporaneously
 - and over the coming days
- In particular, transaction taxes lower liquidity and thereby increase the cost of capital for firms